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Abstract 
There is controversy as to whether or not the subjective sense of right (in the sense of a privilege 
claimable against an assignable person or persons) is found in the ancient time. It is definite, 
however, that in the 17
th
 century Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), Samuel 
Pufendorf (1632-1694), and John Locke (1632-1704) made explicit attempts at conceptualising 
rights. The main claim of this paper is that Imam Ali (599-661), the most revered religious scholar 
among Shiite Muslims, made the first explicit attempt to conceptualise rights in the history of 
political thought. 
I would present Imam Ali’s political theory as a variant of ‘welfare limited guardianship’, which 
embodies several innovations made by him in the history of political ideas. The concept of welfare 
state, as well as the concept of publicly confirmed guardianship, registers Imam Ali as a definite 
original political thinker in history. Further, his concept of citizens’ rights that guarantees his view of 
limited government should be received as another innovation in the history of political thought. 
Unfortunately, however, the influence of his original political theory had to wait until Nā’īnī (1861-
1936), the political theorist of the ‘Iranian Constitutionalist Revolution’ (1905-1911), developed 
Imam Ali’s political theory with a flavour of modernity. 
Introduction 
There is controversy as to whether or not the subjective sense of right is found 
in the ancient time. The 'objective sense of right' is contrasted with 'wrong'. When you 
say that ‘Drinking water is right’, it merely means that this action is not wrong and you 
are not under any obligation to refrain from drinking water. The 'subjective sense of 
right' means the possession of a privilege, benefit, or a choice that correlates with an 
obligation borne by others towards an assignable person. When you say that ‘I have the 
right to the money you borrowed from me’, it means that the other person has an 
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obligation to give your money back. In this second sense, a right means a claim against 
someone who is obliged to fulfil a corresponding obligation. As the obliged side can be 
a person, it can be a group or everyone.1 
The subjective sense of rights is 'something one can have or be given, earn, 
enjoy, or exercise. They are something one can claim, demand, assert, insist on, or 
secure or what one can waive, surrender, relinquish, or forfeit. They can be recognized 
and protected or disregarded, altered, abridged, infringed, whittled away, violated, or 
destroyed’.2 The focus of the examination of this paper is the subjective sense of rights, 
which concisely means a privilege or a choice claimable by a person against other 
assignable person or persons. 
According to Peter Jones, ‘the common wisdom is that neither the ancient 
Greeks nor the ancient Romans possessed the concept of a right’.3 By contrast, Brian 
Tierney asserts that although we cannot find an explicit exposition of the concept of 
rights in ancient Greece and Rome, the concept was implicit in some of their moral 
principles. Tierney, oddly, proposes that evidence to the existence of the concept of 
rights in the ancient time is their commandment ‘Thou shalt not steal’, which implies a 
right to property. According to Tierney, however, an explicit expression of the concept of 
rights appeared in the late Middle Ages in the writings of Henry of Ghent (1217-1293) 
when he proposed that each person had a natural right to self-preservation and property 
in his own body.4 
As opposed to Tierney, Alasdair MacIntyre (1929-) argues that before about 
1400, there was no concept of right or any Hebrew, Greek, Latin, or Arabic word by 
which the subjective sense of right could be expressed. Likewise, Benjamin Constant 
(1767-1830) and Kenneth Dover (1920-2010) suggest that the concept of rights is a 
modern concept.5 However, it is definite that the explicit conceptualisation of the 
subjective sense of rights occurred in the 17th century by Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), 
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Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1694), and John Locke (1632-
1704).6 
The main claim of this paper is that Imam Ali (599-661) made the first explicit 
attempt to conceptualise rights in Arabic Islamic political thought. In this paper, I would, 
firstly, draw a rough picture of Imam Ali’s political theory. I would reconstruct his political 
thought in the form of a theory of the state, showing that he supports a theory of ‘welfare 
limited guardianship’. Further, I shall examine his particular conceptualisation of 
citizens’ rights that reinforces his conception of welfare state, as well as limited 
government. As will be demonstrated, not only is Imam Ali the first political theorist who 
has conceptualised citizens' rights, but he also accords a significance role to rights in 
his political theory. 
Imam Ali is the first Muslim political theorist and the author of the first Islamic 
political essay. He is, also, the fifth ruler in early Muslim society. After the demise of the 
Prophet in 632, Imam Ali took the spiritual leadership of Shiite Muslims, as his political 
leadership was confirmed in 656 by Muslims after Abū Bakr, Umar, and Uthmān. He 
ruled the Muslim society from 27 June 656 to 31 January 661, when he was martyred 
by a member of an opposition group.7 
Imam Ali’s letters and lectures were delivered from 632 to 661, that is, after the 
demise of the Prophet in 632 up until the end of his own life in 661. Yet, most of his 
letters and lectures were delivered during his five-year rulership from 656 to 661. His 
selected works, including several political letters and lectures, were collected by al-
Sharīf al-Raḍī (970-1014) in 1010 in a book named by the collector Nahj al-Balāgha 
(The Way of Eloquence).8 The subjects covered by Imam Ali’s book are broad, including 
metaphysics, theology, morality, politics, history, preach, prayer, the Qur’an, and 
others.9 
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Imam Ali has delivered several letters and lectures concerning political theory. 
Among his political works is a major political essay, which should be conceived of as the 
first Islamic political essay, which draws a picture of the ideal Muslim state. He wrote 
this major political essay in 660 as a collection of directives to Mālik al-Ashtar al-Nakha‘ī 
when he appointed the latter as the governor of Egypt.10 Before the collection of Nahj al-
Balāgha in 1010, this political essay had been preserved among Shiites as an 
independent book, which was one of 400 original Shiite sources of traditions. This letter 
is named by the collector of Imam Ali’s works ‘Kitābuhū lil-Mālik al-Ashtar, which means 
his letter to Mālik al-Ashtar. Yet, since this letter embodies a collection of obligations 
borne by any Islamic rule,11 I would prefer to call it ‘Directives to the Muslim Ruler’.12 
To appreciate that Imam Ali is the author of the first Islamic political essay, we 
should note that the Qur’an, as the first and the highest source of Islamic doctrines and 
morals, did not systematically examine major issues of politics. Rather, it gives 
scattered directives and ordinances with regard to different issues of life in its own 
method, including political matters. Hence, in order to arrive at a Qur’anic political 
theory, one needs to engage in a careful interpretation of several related views and 
concepts, which altogether make a systematic political theory. Nor did the Prophet 
through his letters and lectures supply a comprehensive and systematic picture of the 
ideal Muslim society and government. Nor did Abū Bakr, Umar, and Uthmān engage in 
political theorisation before Imam Ali. Therefore, Imam Ali was the first Muslim who 
engaged in political theorisation through one major political essay, along with several 
other political letters and lectures. 
Imam Ali’s Theory of the State 
In order to more systematically introduce Imam Ali’s political theory, I would 
prefer to reconstruct his views and put them in the form of a theory of the state, which 
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should address three major questions centring on the state, that is, (1) Who should 
rule?, (2) How should one rule?, and (3) Why do we need government? Taking into 
account all these three aspects of a theory of the state, the legitimate political system 
for an Islamic society, according to Imam Ali, is what I would call ‘welfare limited 
guardianship’. Hence, to the question ‘Who should rule in an Islamic society?’, his 
answer confirms a type of guardianship. Further, his answer to the question ‘How 
should the guardian rule?’ confirms the idea of limited and accountable government. 
Finally, as for the purposes of government, his view is that welfare or distributive justice 
is the major purpose of an Islamic government. Now, I explore the major features of the 
Islamic political system he prescribes for an Islamic society. 
Guardianship 
The first feature of the legitimate political system for an Islamic society concerns 
the question ‘Who should rule?’ Imam Ali’s answer to this question proposes the 
concept of ‘guardianship’. There are several Arabic terms in Imam Ali’s discussions 
concerning the question ‘who should rule’ that connote the English notion of 
guardianship: (1) Imāmah13 or Imamate, the adjective of which is Imam14 meaning 
leadership,15 (2) willā’16 and wilāyah17, the adjective of which is waliyy18 and wālly19, 
which can well be equated to the English term guardianship,20 (3) ulū al-amr21 meaning 
the person who possesses authority.22 All these terms have been understood by Shiite 
scholars as indicating guardianship. 
Imam Ali maintains that an Islamic society should be governed by a competent 
figure possessed of the ‘knowledge of Divine laws’, as well as ‘self-restraint’ required for 
implementing those laws.23 Yet, the type of guardianship Imam Ali supports is different 
from Platonic guardianship. For, although the guardian is competent for assuming the 
political power in Islamic society, the public acceptance of the guardian, according to 
Imam Ali, is necessary. In this regard, Imam Ali quotes a saying, in which the Prophet 
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addressed him and said: ‘You are the guardian of my people after me. Hence, if they 
accept your guardianship and consent to it, take the position, and if they disagree on 
your guardianship, leave them with their situations’.24 Hence, it seems appropriate to call 
Imam Ali’s conception of guardianship as ‘publicly confirmed guardianship’. It seems 
that in comparison to Plato’s conception of guardianship, Imam Ali’s theorisation of ‘the 
publicly confirmed guardian rule’ should be considered as a step forward in political 
theory at his time. 
However, the publicly confirmed guardian rule should be distinguished from the 
democratic rule. For, although the public consent is required both in the democratic rule 
and the publicly confirmed guardian rule, the role of consent is different in each case. 
Whilst in the democratic rule the public convey their authority to the elected 
representatives, in the publicly confirmed guardian rule the public confirm the 
competency of the guardian for rulership. What supports this explanation of Imam Ali’s 
conception of guardianship is his suggestion that once the public confirm the 
competency of a person for rulership, they would have no option to withdraw their 
acceptance.25 Hence, whilst Imam Ali’s conception of legitimacy proposes ‘social 
contract’ as necessary, his social contract should be distinguished from the ‘democratic 
social contract’. 
It should be noted, however, that there is controversy as to whether the 
guardian rule is exclusively confined to the Shiite Imams who are generally believed to 
be ‘infallible’ and possessed of the ‘true knowledge of Divine laws’, or ‘self-restrained 
but fallible’ Shiite scholars possessed of an ‘imperfect knowledge of Divine laws’ should 
be considered as competent quite the same as the Shiite Imams. Put another way, is 
Imam Ali’s view of guardianship valid at the present time when the Shiite Imams are 
absent from Islamic society? If not, is another type of government legitimate for Muslim 
societies at the present time? Faced with this question, Shiite scholars have proposed 
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four theories of the state: (1) the theory of guardianship, (2) the theory of Islamic 
deliberative democracy, (3) the theory of mixed government or semi-democracy, and (4) 
the non-ideal theory. 
Muhammad Bin Hassan al-Tūsī (995-1068), the first great Shiite jurist received 
as the leader of the Shiites after the Imams26, explicitly rejects the competency of 
anyone except the Shiite Imams for ruling Muslim society.27 According to al-Tūsī, in the 
absence of the Shiite Imams, as the present time, there can be no legitimate rule in 
Islamic society. Hence, he provides some guidelines for Shiite Muslims with regard to 
political engagement in the absence of the Shiite Imams.28 This is what I call the non-
ideal theory. 
In a sharp contrast to al-Tūsī, Imam Khomeini (1900-1989) argues that ‘self-
restrained but fallible’ Shiite jurists are almost as competent as the Shiite Imams for 
assuming the political power in Islamic society. Hence, in the absence of Shiite Imams, 
the guardianship of Islamic society has been entrusted to pious jurists.29 This is what 
can be called the theory of guardianship. 
A third Shiite political theory has been suggested by Muhammad Hussein Nā’īnī 
(1861-1936), the political theorist of the ‘Iranian Constitutionalist Revolution’ (1905-
1911). He supports a type of legitimate Islamic rule, which I call ‘mixed government’ or 
‘semi-democratic rule’, in which political powers are divided between self-restrained but 
fallible Shiite jurists and the public who act through their representatives. Along with his 
approval of the guardianship of self-restrained but fallible Shiite jurists,30 he attaches 
mush importance to freedom, equality, public participation, the rule of law, and limited 
government.31 Hence, his commitment to the guardianship of Shiite jurists should be 
interpreted as quasi-guardianship. 
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Limited Government 
The second feature of the legitimate political system for an Islamic society 
concerns the question ‘How should one rule?’ Imam Ali’s answer to this question 
proposes the concept of limited government. Hence, as for the dichotomy of 
absolutism/constitutionalism, Imam Ali definitely advocates constitutionalism or limited 
government. The guardianship, which he supports, is not an absolutist form of rule. By 
proposing the idea of limited government, Imam Ali takes one more step away from 
Platonic guardianship. There are two ways in which Imam Ali expresses his 
commitment to limited government, that is, the restriction of political obligation and the 
accountability of the ruler to the public. 
Firstly, Imam Ali confirms that political obligation is limited to the extent that the 
ruler employs his power rightly. In a letter he sent to Egyptians after appointing al-
Ashtar as their governor, Imam Ali asked them to obey al-Ashtar to the extent that his 
commands correspond to the right.32 Hence, since political obligation is required by the 
legitimate rule, wherever there is no political obligation, there would be no legitimate 
rule. Further, wherever political obligation is limited, the legitimacy of government is 
limited. Therefore, Imam Ali’s suggestion that the political obligation of Muslim citizens 
is limited should be taken as indicating his commitment to limited government. What 
more forcefully illuminates Imam Ali’s commitment to constitutionalism lies in his 
innovative conceptualisation of citizens’ rights against the ruler. This issue will be 
discussed in detail later in this paper. 
Secondly, Imam Ali’s view concerning the accountability of the ruler to the 
public is another indicator of his commitment to limited government. In what I call 
‘Directives to the Muslim Ruler’, Imam Ali advises the Muslim governor to refrain from 
dictatorship. There, he says: ‘Do not say: “I have been given authority, I should 
command and should be obeyed”, for this attitude is corruptive of the heart, destructive 
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of the faith, and potential for overthrowing you’.33 The opposite of dictatorship here is 
accountability to the public, an idea that Imam Ali explicitly expresses elsewhere in the 
same Essay. 
To explain his view of the accountability of the ruler to the public, Imam Ali asks 
his governor to publicly provide information about his decisions and performance. The 
Muslim ruler, according to Imam Ali, should have direct communication with the public in 
order to inform them of the governmental decisions and practices. Furthermore, 
whenever the public hesitate about the appropriateness of some governmental 
practices, Muslim authorities should try to justify their performance to the public.34 The 
obligation of the ruler to give information to the public and to justify governmental 
decisions is, definitely, equal to the accountability of the ruler to the public. The 
accountability of the ruler in its turn is an opposite of the absolutist rule. For, if the 
authority of the ruler is absolute, he will be free to act as he sees fit. Further, if the ruler 
is free to act as he sees fit, he will not be accountable to anyone. By contrast, if the ruler 
has to explain and justify his decisions to the public, he will possess limited authority. 
Imam Ali’s view of limited government had a full influence upon Nā’īnī. 
As was indicated above, Nā’īnī is the first Shiite scholar who discussed modern 
political concepts, such as the rule of law, freedom, equality, public participation, 
elections, representation, and constitutionalism. It should be emphasised here that his 
major concern was with setting restriction on political power. Hence, he classifies 
political regimes into ‘constitutional’ and ‘authoritarian’, and denounces the latter for 
preventing individuals from the basic level of freedom. According to Nā’īnī, the only 
effective solution to the problem of authoritarianism is limited government in which the 
public take partly the control of their fate.35 Therefore, in Nā’īnī’s political theory, we find 
the first manifestation of Imam Ali’s view of limited government presented with a flavour 
of modernity. 
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Welfare State 
The third feature of the Islamic rule concerns the question ‘Why do we need 
government?’ Imam Ali’s answer to this question puts much emphasis on a conception 
of ‘needs-based distributive justice’. The idea of distributive justice on the basis of 
needs is, definitely, an innovation by Imam Ali found neither in ancient Greek and 
Roman philosophy, nor in ancient Chinese philosophy. Further, although the Qur’an has 
some rules for taking care of the needy, it does not ground them in term of justice. 
Rather, the Qur’anic rules concerning the distribution of goods according to needs are in 
the form of some advice to the rich with no clear explanation of the enforceability of this 
moral duty through political power. Moreover, although the Qur’an has a conception of 
justice, it is desert-based, rather than being needs-based. Hence, Imam Ali is the first 
who conceptualised a theory of ‘needs-based distributive justice’, of course quite in line 
of the Qur’anic teachings. 
In several lectures, he proposes that the Islamic rule is not something valuable 
per se; rather, political power is intended to provide some ‘common goods’ for the ruled 
unavailable in anarchical societies. An Islamic government is obligated, according to 
Imam Ali, to provide the following goods for society:36 (1) security and peace,37 (2) 
economic development,38 (3) social justice,39 (4) and individual virtues.40 Unfortunately, 
he does not provide us with a priority rule, which balances these purposes when conflict 
arises. This is not, however, something unexpected in fourteen centuries ago. This is a 
task that should be discharged by contemporary Shiite political theory. 
With regard to justice, the Arabic terms used by Imam Ali are al-‘adl,41 which is 
equal to justice, and al-insāf,42 which is equal to fairness. Imam Ali conceives of justice 
as including the following cases: (1) formal justice,43 (2) retributive justice,44 (3) 
compensatory justice,45 (4) transactional justice,46 and (5) distributive justice.47 Three 
preliminary points should be mentioned with regard to Imam Ali’s conception of 
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distributive justice. Firstly, his discussion of distributive justice has been put in term of 
fairness. Secondly, among all areas of justice, distributive fairness occupies the highest 
position in his discussion of justice. Thirdly, it is in his discussion of distributive fairness 
that Imam Ali introduces his innovative concept of citizens’ rights. 
Imam Ali’s conception of distributive justice is not egalitarian. He does not 
support equality of income and wealth for all citizens. Nor does his conception of justice 
directly necessitate reducing or removing the gap between the rich and the poor. In 
other words, Imam Ali’s conception of justice is not comparative.48 Confirming the 
entitlement of the rich to their property, his conception of distributive justice requires 
meeting the basic needs of the poor. 
As for the entitlement of the rich to their property, in ‘Directives to the Muslim 
Ruler’, he advises his governor to pay attention to the ‘merchants’ and ‘industrialists’ by 
respecting their self-steam, as well as providing security for their job, along with taxing 
them appropriately so that taxation does not damage their motivation. To motivate his 
governor for discharging his duty towards the merchants and industrialists, Imam Ali 
resorts to two ‘utilitarian’ grounds. Firstly, he argues that merchants and industrialists 
supply necessary goods for society, as well as paying taxes required for public 
expenditures. Secondly, he suggests that merchants and industrialists are pacifist 
persons, and hence are not dangerous for the stability of society.49 
However, it should be noted that when Imam Ali grounds the necessity of 
respecting the merchants and industrialists in their usefulness to society, he does not 
conceive of them merely as a means to meeting the needs of the poor. For, he 
acknowledges the worth of every human being in general, firstly, by confirming that 
every individual is the subject of morality,50 and secondly, by proposing that justice 
should be applied even to one’s enemy.51 Therefore, according to Imam Ali, Islamic 
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society should acknowledge the entitlement of the rich to their property and their 
unequal shares. 
As for the necessity of meeting the basic needs of the poor, again in ‘Directives 
to the Muslim Ruler’, he argues that individuals from the lower class, including the poor, 
the bedridden, the elderly, and the orphans, should have a share in public resources to 
the extent that their situation becomes good.52 The goodness of the situation of the 
needy should be understood as the satisfaction of their basic needs. Not only does he 
propose that the basic needs of the needy should be met, but he also puts this needs-
satisfaction in terms of fairness. Moreover, Imam Ali maintains that there should be a 
governmental body he calls ‘the fairness-fraternity department’ (ummāl al-insāf wa al-
rifq) for distributing basic goods to the needy. In addition to the requirement of satisfying 
the basic needs of the poor, the expenses of all governmental branches, including the 
‘military department’, the ‘administration department’, the ‘judiciary department’, and ‘the 
fairness-fraternity department’, should be paid by taxation.53 
In all cases, Imam Ali’s conception of distributive justice requires that the 
situation of everyone should be good, compared to the particular efforts he makes to the 
common good. Hence, we can infer that he does not interpret justice as providing a 
unified level of prosperity for all citizens. Rather, he incorporates into the concept of 
justice proportionality between the public burdens everyone bears with public benefits 
that person receives. His conception of distributive justice can be capsulated into the 
following maxim: ‘distribution according to everyone’s needs as well as his contribution 
to the common good’. This conception can be demonstrated as the following two 
principles of justice in order: 
1. The Islamic government should provide basic goods for each citizen. 
2. Having provided basic goods for all citizens, the Islamic government should 
distribute public resources according to different efforts citizens make in 
promoting the common good. 
13 
It should be noted that a similar conception of distributive justice appeared in 
the political theory of a thirteen Shiite philosopher, Khāji Naṣīr al-Dīn Tūsī (1201-1274). 
Examining different principles of justice in his moral and political philosophy book 
entitled Akhlāqi Nāṣirī, he suggests that the legitimate ruler should equally distribute 
‘common goods’ to all citizens. Tūsī’s list of common goods includes ‘healthcare’, ‘self-
steam’, and ‘property’. The second criterion for distributive justice, according to Tūsī, is 
distribution according to everyone’s entitlement.54 Although the latter can be connected 
to one’s effort made to promote the common good, Tūsī is not as clear as Imam Ali on 
conceiving one’s effort as the ground for his entitlement. 
So far, I have attempted to introduce Imam Ali’s theory of the state, by 
suggesting that he conceives of ‘welfare limited guardianship’ as the legitimate political 
system for a Muslim society. His view of welfare state and limited government brings us 
to his conceptualisation of citizens’ rights, which is intended to provide the most 
sufficient means to restricting the authority of the guardian. In the following section, I 
shall attempt to explore his innovative conceptualisation of citizens’ rights. 
Imam Ali’s Conceptualisation of Rights 
In Arabic, as in English, there is one term signifying the objective sense of right 
and the subjective sense of right. The word ḥaqq55 is the Arabic term equal to the 
English word right. Its plural form is ḥuqūq. In all cases, where the word ḥaqq is used in 
its objective sense, the preposition ‘al-’ comes before it. This preposition is equal to the 
English preposition ‘the’. When Imam Ali intends to use the term ḥaqq in its subjective 
sense, usually the pronoun ‘hū’ or ‘hūm’ comes with it. The pronoun hū is equal to the 
pronoun his, whereas the pronoun hum is equal to the pronoun their. Hence, in most 
cases, where Imam Ali uses the subjective sense of right, the term ḥaqquhū, meaning 
his right, or ḥuqūquhūm, meaning their rights, are employed. 
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According to Imam Ali, a right is a ‘benefit’ for the right-holder, as it is a ‘burden’ 
upon the duty-bearer. Hence, there is a correlation between a right and a duty. In this 
regard, Imam Ali, as the ruler, addresses the public and says: ‘Definitely, I have a right 
against you, and you have a right against me’.56 Here, he defines a right as something, 
from which one party benefits, and for which the other party bears responsibility. Hence, 
the first feature of Imam Ali’s concept of rights is the ‘correlation of rights and duties’. 
In addition to the correlation between a right and a duty, Imam Ali defines a right 
as something mutually possessed. Wherever a party possesses a right, the correlated 
duty-bearer possesses a corresponding right. Hence, the possession of rights is 
reciprocal. In other words, when a duty-bearer respects a right possessed by the right-
holder, the former is entitled for a benefit, that is, a right. In this regard, Imam Ali says: 
‘God the Immaculate has confirmed a right for me, as your ruler, against you, and you 
have a corresponding right against me. A right is easily described but respected with 
difficulty. Wherever a right exists to the advantage of a person, a right exists against the 
same person. Likewise, wherever a right exists against a person, a right exists to the 
advantage of the same person … There are rights for some persons against some 
others on balance. Some rights bring about some other rights, and some rights are 
confirmed by some other rights’.57 Therefore, the second feature of Imam Ali’s concept 
of rights is the ‘reciprocal existence of rights’. 
Required by the reciprocal existence of rights is the ‘reciprocal respect of rights’. 
Hence, the third feature of rights, according to Imam Ali, is that individuals should 
respect the rights of those who respect their rights. Otherwise, by respecting the rights 
of those who violate the rights of a person, the latter damages his dignity and freedom. 
In this regard, Imam Ali has two short sentences. Firstly, he maintains that ‘Whoever 
respects the rights of the person who does not respect his rights has made himself his 
slave’.58 Put it more clearly, if person A respects the rights of person B, while person B 
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violates the rights of person A, person A has made himself a slave to person B. 
Therefore, the respect of rights has a crucial part in the dignity and freedom of persons. 
In a complementary comment, Imam Ali suggests that one should not dispose of his 
basic freedom. In an advice to his son, he says: ‘Do not make yourself a slave to 
another person, for God has made you free’.59 Therefore, Imam Ali describes claiming 
one’s rights as a means to preserving one’s natural freedom and dignity. Hence, 
freedom and dignity is equal to claiming one’s rights. 
What complements Imam Ali’s concept of citizens’ rights is his proposition that 
individuals who live in an Islamic society possess rights against the ruler and vice versa. 
Recall that, according to Imam Ali, rights exist reciprocally and should be respected 
reciprocally, too. Now, he suggests that the ‘most important rights’ are those that are 
held in the relations between the ruler and the ruled. In this regard, he states that ‘The 
greatest rights among human beings confirmed by God is the right of the ruler against 
the ruled and the right of the ruled against the ruler … Hence, when the ruled respect 
the right of the ruler and the ruler respects the right of the ruled, the truth gets powerful 
between them, … life becomes enjoyable, the stability of the state is guaranteed, and 
the enemies become hopeless’.60 Imam Ali, hence, has a concept of citizens’ rights, 
which hold between the ruler and the ruled in an Islamic society. 
To the question ‘What is the right of the ruler against the ruled, and vice versa?’, 
Imam Ali’s response confirms that citizens have ‘a right to prosperity’, ‘a right to 
education’, ‘a right to moral progress’, and ‘a right to the good-will of the ruler’, which 
can altogether be called ‘welfare rights’. Reciprocally, the ruler has ‘a right to 
obedience’.61 The respect of the right of the ruler requires that citizens obey his 
commands. When citizens obey the ruler, their right to welfare is confirmed. By contrast, 
if the ruler fails to provide welfare for citizens, he will forfeit his right to obedience. 
Likewise, when the ruled fail to obey the ruler, they will forfeit their right to welfare. This 
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view concerning citizens’ rights sheds light on Imam Ali’s conception of limited 
government, as well as political obligation. 
As discussed earlier in this paper, Imam Ali rejects authoritarianism and 
supports limited government. What reinforces his commitment to limited government is 
his concept of citizens’ rights. The scope of the authority of the Islamic government is 
limited by citizens’ rights. Citizens are morally obliged to obey the ruler so long as the 
ruler provides them with welfare. As soon as the ruler proves not to respect citizens’ 
rights, the former forfeits his right to obedience. Put another way, the scope of the 
political obligation of citizens is limited to the situation where the ruler provides them 
with welfare. As soon as the ruler proves not to respect citizens’ rights, the latter get rid 
of their political obligation. Therefore, Imam Ali’s concept of citizens’ rights reinforces his 
theory of the welfare state, as well as his theory of limited government, along with his 
particular concept of social contract. 
There is room, however, for incorporating into Imam Ali’s list of citizens’ rights 
other rights correlated with different obligations borne by the Islamic rule, including ‘a 
right to security’, and ‘a right to economic development’. Hence, every obligation borne 
by the Islamic rule confers a right possessed by citizens. Reciprocally, the obligation of 
citizens to obey the ruler confers on the ruler a right to obedience. 
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